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Tässä tutkimuksessa rakennetaan dynaaminen yleisen tasapainon makromalli Kiinan talou-
den tutkimiseksi. Malli sisältää hintajäykkyyden, jäykät kulutustottumukset (habit formati-
on) ja pääoman sopeuttamisen kustannukset. Malli kalibroidaan Kiinan talouden tilastoista 
lasketuilla parametreilla. Tutkimuksessa arvioidaan kahdessa eri skenaariossa, miten tek-
niikka- ja rahapolitiikkasokit vaikuttavat Kiinan talouteen. Perustilassa investointien osuus 
kokonaiskysynnästä on suuri. Uudessa tasapainon tilassa talouskasvu perustuu selvästi ny-
kyistä suurempaan kotimaisen kulutuksen osuuteen. Tutkimuksessa selvitetään, miten Kii-
nan talouden rakenteiden uudistaminen vaikuttaa sokkien välittymismekanismeihin. Tut-
kimuksen  päätulos  on,  että  talouden  rakenteiden  uudistaminen  vähentää  reaalitalouden 
herkkyyttä tekniikkasokille. Tulosten mukaan suositus Kiinan talouden kasvumallin muut-
tamisesta kulutusvetoiseksi näyttää perustellulta. 
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Abstract
We construct a small-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model that features price rigidities, habit formation in consump-
tion and costs in capital adjustment, and calibrate the model with data
for the Chinese economy. Our interest centers on the impact of technology
and monetary policy shocks for diﬀerent structures of the Chinese econ-
omy. In particular, we evaluate how a rebalancing of the economy from
investment-led to consumption-led growth would aﬀect the economic dy-
namics after a shock occurs. Our ﬁndings suggest that a rebalancing
would reduce the volatility of the real economy in the event of a tech-
nology shock, which provides support for policies aiming to increase the
consumption share in China.
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In 2010, China passed Japan to become the second largest economy in the
world at market exchange rates. Since the start of reforms in 1978, the coun-
try has recorded annual real GDP growth rates averaging 10 percent, and has
been able to lift hundreds of millions of its citizens from poverty. Despite this
success, measured in terms of macroeconomic performance, there is now a con-
sensus among both Chinese policymakers and international observers that the
economy’s growth model would beneﬁt from a broad rebalancing away from
investment and export-led growth to growth based on domestic consumption.1
China’s 12th Five Year Plan (2011-15) aims to shift from export-led sectors
to domestic demand by raising the incomes of Chinese workers (Xinhua, 2010).
In its 2010 Article IV Consultation on China, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) noted that the current policy challenge is to maintain growth while at
the same time changing to an economy "powered by the Chinese consumer"
(IMF, 2010). The IMF argues that continued progress is needed, e.g. in terms
of exchange rate policy, ﬁnancial liberalization and development, healthcare,
pensions and education, in order to meet the goal of rebalancing. Similarly,
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) argues that failure to rebalance the Chi-
nese economy would jeopardize the sustainability of growth (ADB, 2010). The
ADB states that a greater role for private consumption demand would "promote
longer-term growth and raise living standards".2
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of a rebalancing of the Chinese economy
on its response to diﬀerent shocks. To this aim, we present a small-scale dynamic
1The investment ratio (gross ﬁxed capital formation as share of GDP) in China was 44%
of GDP in 2008, with ﬁnal consumption expenditure amounting to 48% of GDP. In the US
economy, ﬁnal consumption-to-GDP was close to 88%, but some emerging economies also
feature a high ratio of ﬁnal consumption expenditure to GDP. In India, the ratio was close to
71%.
2Not all economists agree on the need to lower the investment share of GDP in China. Woo
(2009) states that consumption-led growth is an oxymoron, as growth requires expansion of
productive capacity and this cannot be done by lowering investment. According to Woo, the
correct rebalancing would be to increase consumption at the expense of the trade surplus. As
our model economy is closed, we do not address this method of rebalancing. However, we
note that the contribution of net exports to GDP growth in China is minor for most years
(and actually negative in 2009).
1stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model featuring price rigidities, habit
formation in consumption and adjustment costs in investment, calibrated for
the Chinese economy. While such models, based on microfoundations, have
emerged as the basis of much current policy analysis, the literature employing
DSGE models is still relatively sparse for China.3 As an example of recent
work in a closed-economy DSGE framework, Zhang (2009) explores whether
money supply or interest rate rules are more eﬀective in managing the Chinese
macroeconomy. In an open-economy multi-country DSGE framework, Straub
and Thimann (2010) analyze macroeconomic adjustment in China under ﬂexible
and ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
Our analysis centers on the response of the economy to shocks of both the
technology and monetary type in two diﬀerent scenarios. In the ﬁrst one, the
share of investment in GDP is maintained at its current high level by interna-
tional comparison. In the second scenario, after a substantial rebalancing of
the economy, China’s investment-to-GDP ratio is lower by 25 percentage points
and the share of consumption is raised accordingly. We ﬁnd a less persistent
and smaller long-run response of the real economy to technology shocks in the
scenario where rebalancing has changed the economy to one fuelled by domestic
consumption. The lower volatility in the face of technology shocks is enhanced
if the rebalancing also involves a greater role for monetary policy in the sta-
bilization of output. The impact of monetary policy shocks in the economy
remains similar in the new scenario. These results are robust to various changes
in the model parameters. The results indicate that a structural rebalancing
would make the real economy less prone to large ﬂuctuations due to technology
shocks, providing support for policies aiming to increase the consumption share
in China’s GDP.
This paper is structured as follows. The following section describes our
3One may question the suitability of the general equilibrium paradigm for an economy
undergoing signiﬁcant structural change. Nevertheless, Chow (2010) mentions that "good
quantitative relations are valid for diﬀerent periods in China, including both the periods of
planning and after market reform". Moreover, the social and economic development targets
of the Central Economic Working Commission have included GDP growth targets ranging
between 7 and 9 percent since 1994, which could be seen as an implicit assumption of a
steady-state growth path.
2general equilibrium model. Section 3 discusses the calibration parameters and
presents the simulation results. Section 4 concludes with policy implications.
2 The Model
The economy consists of four types of agents: an inﬁnitely-lived representative
household, a representative ﬁnal-good producer, a continuum of intermediate-
good producers, and a monetary authority. All agents maximize their utility
(with ﬁrms maximizing proﬁts), subject to an intertemporal budget constraint.
Rigidities in the model stem from staggered price setting of ﬁrms, habit forma-
tion in consumption and capital adjustment costs. The labor market is fully
competitive, however, which is easily justiﬁed especially in the Chinese indus-
trial sector.4 In our model, the size of the labor force remains unchanged. This
is in line with current Chinese demographics; as the growth of labor force is
expected to stall within a few years, the environment of labor abundance is fast
approaching its end in China.5
We consider a closed-economy model, in line with Zhang (2009), as capi-
tal controls have been largely binding in China.6 Therefore, uncovered interest
parity need not hold and domestic monetary policy has enjoyed relative inde-
pendence despite the de facto US dollar peg for substantial periods of time.7
4Using data for 2008 and adding up the number of oﬃcial urban workers (302 million) and
migrant workers (some 200 million; see e.g. Zhang and Wang, 2009), the urban job market
now accounts for two thirds of the total Chinese labor market.
5From a cyclical perspective, the labor market has become signiﬁcantly tighter since the
global crisis, as the numbers of underemployed workers in both rural and urban areas have
fallen.
6See Ma and McCauley, 2008, for evidence on the eﬃcacy of capital controls in China.
7Clarida et al. (2001) explore the conditions under which the problem of monetary policy
design for a small open economy is isomorphic to the problem for a closed economy. They
show that all the qualitative results for the closed economy carry over to the open economy.
International factors are relevant to the extent that they aﬀect domestic inﬂation or the
equilibrium real rate; such transmission is arguably of limited importance in the Chinese case
due to restrictions on capital ﬂows.
32.1 Households
The representative household in the model maximizes utility from consumption















where  gives the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and  is a measure of
the inverse elasticity of labor supply. The model takes account of external habit
formation via the variable . It is assumed that the external habit stock is
proportional to aggregate past consumption,  ≡ −1 where 0 ≤ 1
Maximization of life-time utility, (1), is subject to periodic budget and in-
vestment constraints:
 ( + )+ ≤ −1 +  + 
 +  (2)








At period , the household possesses capital goods  and −1 of coupon
bonds. In addition, it receives labor income  for hours worked () and
rental income of 
 for renting the capital services . Any net lump sum
transfers (e.g. dividends and net transfers from the government) are collected in
the variable . Final goods are purchased at price  a n du s e df o rc o n s u m p t i o n
 and investment . 
 denotes the rental rate of capital, and the price of the
bond is  ≡ 1
1+
 where 
 is the (riskless) short-term nominal interest rate.
The household takes prices (  ) as given and is subject to a solvency
constraint, lim
−→∞
 {} ≥ 0
The household makes investment decisions in terms of physical capital. Cap-
ital formation is described by (3), where  is the depreciation rate of capital and
the function ( −1) summarizes the technology transforming investment
into installed capital. Adjustment costs in the model (·) result from changes
in the level of investment relative to the previous period. Following Christiano
et al. (2005), we assume that the investment adjustment cost function has the
following steady state features: (1) = 0(1) = 0 and 00(1) = 0 repre-
senting the adjustment costs. As usual, the timing convention is such that 
denotes capital at the end of period  − 1 (and thus does not depend on time 
shocks).
4The ﬁrst-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem can be
summarized by (4)-(7), where the variable 
 denotes the value of invested










 ( − )

































As is standard in the literature, we assume that there is a single ﬁnal good  in
the closed economy that is produced by a perfectly competitive representative
ﬁrm. As production inputs, the ﬁnal-good producer uses a continuum of inter-
mediate goods (), indexed by  ∈ [01], each produced by a monopolistically
competitive ﬁrm. The production technology for packaging intermediate goods









where 1 ≤ ∞,a n d is a measure of the elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerent intermediate goods.
Given the prices of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods () and proﬁtm a x i -


















5In the intermediate-goods sector, production possibilities are given by a Cobb-
Douglas production function:
()=()()1−, (11)
for all intermediate ﬁrms  ∈ [01], i.e. all ﬁrms use the same technology. In
the production function (11), () and () denote time  capital and labor
services, respectively, used to produce an amount () of the th intermediate
good, and  is the elasticity of output with respect to capital. Technology is
subject to the following path: ln()=( 1−)ln(¯ )+ ln(−1)+
,w h e r e
¯  is the mean of  and 
 denotes the technology shock.




















Note that marginal costs are equal for all ﬁrms and the index  can therefore be
dropped.
Staggered price setting of ﬁrms is in line with conventional Calvo pricing
(Calvo, 1983). We assume that in each period intermediate ﬁrms are able to
adjust their prices, but only a constant fraction 1− of ﬁrms are able to set their
prices optimally. The remaining fraction  of ﬁr m st h a tc a n n o tr e o p t i m i z ea r e
assumed to index their prices to lagged inﬂation: ()=Π−1−1(),w h e r e
Π ≡ 
−1. Firms that are able to reoptimize, will set prices so as to maximize
t h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ff u t u r ep r o ﬁts. All the ﬁrms that can reoptimize at time 
w i l lc h o o s et h es a m ep r i c e ,∗
 .U s i n gt h ed e m a n df u n c t i o nf o rﬁrm  (9), the












Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule for setting the nominal short term interest
rate:

 =  + b  +  +  , (14)
where b  denotes the output gap and  is an exogenous component of the
interest rate that follows an autoregressive process similarly to technology:  =
6−1 + 
. The monetary policy rule is expressed in logarithms as in the
original formulation of Taylor (1993). The policy reaction parameters  and
 determine the magnitude of the central bank’s reactions to deviations of
inﬂation and output from the steady state. Zhang (2009) argues that following
an interest rate rule is indeed superior to a money supply rule for China, as it
leads to less ﬂuctuations in the economy. Nevertheless, some of the previous
research has applied McCallum-type rules for China; see e.g. Burdekin and
Siklos (2008) and Mehrotra and Sánchez-Fung (2010).
2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is described by the market clearing conditions:
R 1
0 () = 
and
R 1
0 () = . In addition, in the closed-economy equilibrium, the goods
market clearing condition requires  =  + .
The model is characterized by equations (15)-(26), expressed as logarithmic
deviations from the zero inﬂation steady state.8
The household’s ﬁrst-order conditions (4)-(7) yield the consumption Euler
equation (15), the investment Euler equation (16) and the optimality condition
for the capital stock (17):









 = [(b  −b −1) − {b +1 −b }] (16)
b 
 = − 
1− [{b +1 − b } − (b  − b −1)]
+[1 − (1 − )]{b 
+1} + (1 − ){b 
+1}
(17)
Combining the intermediate ﬁrm’s and household’s ﬁrst-order conditions,
marginal costs and optimal labor demand can be linearized:




(b  − b −1)+b 
¸
+ b 





(b  − b −1)+( 1+)b  − b  (19)
Linearizing the price equation (13) and using the linearized proﬁt-maximization
condition for the intermediate-good ﬁrm, the New Keynesian Phillips curve for
8Throughout the paper lowercase letters denote variables in natural logarithms and hatted
varibles represent log-deviations from the steady state.
7the model can be expressed as a function of the deviation of marginal costs from
















The linear production function, the log-linearized capital accumulation equa-
tion, and the market clearing condition follow:
b  = b  + b  +( 1− )b  (21)









 is the steady state investment share of GDP ratio and 
 =1− 
 .
The Taylor rule for setting the nominal interest rate in log-deviation form is
written as
b 
 = b  +  + b  (24)
Finally, as technology and an exogenous component of the interest rate fol-
low ﬁrst-order autoregressive processes, 
 and 
 are interpreted as shocks to
technology and monetary policy, respectively, and are obtained from
b  = b −1 + 
 (25)
and
b  = b −1 + 
. (26)
Here,   ∈ [01), and we assume that {
} and {
} are white noise
processes orthogonal to each other.
3A n a l y s i s
3.1 Parameterization
Choosing the model parameters requires care, even more so in the case of China
given the transitional nature of its economy. We estimate some of the parame-
ters, and for others the available literature is used to choose the appropriate
parameter values.
8Starting with the household sector, the discount factor is set at  =0 985,
which yields a quarterly real interest rate of 1.5 percent, and an annual real rate
of 6.1 percent.9 We follow Walsh (2003) in setting the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution ( =2 ), and Zhang (2009) in determining the marginal disutility
of working ( =6 16). In China, marginal disutility of working can be assumed
to be low, which contributes to the high household savings rate.10 The Calvo
parameter is set at  =0 84, again in line with Zhang (2009), implying an
average price duration of slightly over one and a half years.
The (external) habit persistence parameter is estimated by Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) from an Euler equation featuring lagged inﬂation, forward-
looking inﬂation, and the real ex ante interest rate.11 The estimated coeﬃcient
on lagged inﬂation, 0.76 in quarterly terms, is used as our measure of habit
persistence.
Moving on to parameters related to ﬁrms in our model, we adopt a capital
depreciation rate of  =0 06.12 Regarding the output elasticity of capital, we
set  =0 6, as in He et al. (2007).
Regarding the adjustment cost parameter , note that the household’s Euler
equation for investment is
9For comparison, the mean one-year nominal benchmark lending rate in China was 7.3
percent during 1994-2008.
10Wei and Zhang (2009) argue that as the sex ratio rises, Chinese families with sons increase
their savings to improve their son’s relative attractiveness for marriage. According to their
results, this factor could be an important contributor to the experienced increase in the
household saving rate during 1990-2008.
11The estimation is based on data from China’s National Accounts from 1989 to 2008.
Consumption is deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator, and the real ex ante interest rate is measured
as the nominal benchmark lending rate deﬂated by one period ahead retail price inﬂation.
All variables are measured as log deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered trend (with
a smoothing parameter of 100 for annual data). The instrument set includes second and
third lags of consumption, together with ﬁrst and second lags of the real interest rate. The
overidentifying restrictions are not rejected for this instrument set (J-statistic 0.69, p-value
0.71).
12An assumed high depreciation rate of capital is in line with conclusions from informal
discussions with industrialists operating in China. As an example for machinery in the elec-
tronics sector, capital is sometimes assumed to depreciate fully in just three years. He et al.
(2005) suggest a capital depreciation rate of 0.05 for China.









 is the elasticity of investment with respect to the current price of
installed capital. We estimate the elasticity using Chinese data. According to
Christiano et al. (2005), b 
 is the shadow value of a unit of +1 measured
in consumption units as at the time when the period  investment and capital
utilization decisions are made. We approximate b 
 by the value of investment
at time  +1 ,13 albeit the value of investment is probably a noisy indicator of
the current value of installed capital. We measure b  at time  by de-trended
real gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF), and approximate the current price
of installed capital by de-trended nominal value of GFCF at time +1.14 With
 =0 985, the elasticity of investment is equal to 029, i.e. very close to the
proposed elasticity of 0.28 for the US economy in Christiano et al. (2005).
Regarding the policy dimension of our model, we set the parameters of the
monetary policy rule at  =1 34 and  =0 , based on an estimation of a
Taylor rule for China by GMM, using the benchmark one-year lending rate as
the policy instrument and adjusting for the coeﬃcient on lagged interest rates.15
Therefore, monetary policy in China is assumed to fulﬁl the Taylor principle
(  1), which is in line with the empirical observation that China’s inﬂation
has been remarkably low since the mid-1990s, especially in light of the economy’s
rapid growth rate. An alternative reading of the inﬂation experience is that
potential growth rates are high and that large output gaps have simply not
13In optimum, the marginal household must be indiﬀerent between saving (i.e. investment)
and consumption. Therefore, a household that decides to accrue capital must forgo con-
sumption. Since the value of investment is the value of foregone consumption, the value of
investment at time  +1must also reﬂect the current price of installed capital  
 at time .
14We approximate the Euler equation for investment (27) by




where we have ﬁltered the linear trends from both series, and use the ﬁrst forward value
of investment as the shadow price. For robustness, we estimated two other speciﬁcations.
First, we included two forward values for nominal GFCF in the model and, second, the
contemporaneous value and ﬁr s tf o r w a r dv a l u eo fG F C Fw e r ei n c l u d e d . T h ea p p r o x i m a t e d
1
’s are surprisingly similar in both speciﬁcations (0.30 and 0.24).
15The estimation period for the Taylor rule is 1994Q1-2008Q4, and the ﬁrst lag of the
inﬂation gap and the second lag of the interest rate are used as instruments.
10emerged. Nevertheless, Zhang (2009) and Mehrotra and Sánchez-Fung (2010)
provide evidence that the People’s Bank of China has been reacting to inﬂation
expectations in a statistically signiﬁcant manner, pursuing stabilizing policy
even in a forward-looking sense. The size of the interest rate shock 
 is set
at 0.25, implying an increase of 25 basis points in , and its autocorrelation
is assumed to be  =0 5. Regarding an exogenous shock to technology, we
assume that 
 =1and  =0 9, implying that the technology shock is quite
persistent.
Finally, the investment-to-GDP ratio () i ss e ta t0 . 4 5i nt h eb e n c h m a r k
estimation, roughly in line with the share of gross capital formation in China’s
GDP in 2008. As our economy is closed, the share of consumption in GDP
amounts to 1 − ()=0 55, which is slightly higher than the oﬃcial data
indicate for 2008 (0.48). In order to assess the dynamics of the model in the
"rebalanced" scenario, we lower the investment-to-GDP ratio by 25 percentage
points. The resulting investment ratio of 0.20 is equal to gross capital forma-
tion as a share of GDP in high-income countries in 2008, according to data from
the World Bank Development Indicators. The higher share of consumption in
the rebalanced economy needs to be supported by a higher labor share of in-
come, and the output elasticity of capital () is accordingly lowered from 0.6
to 0.4. Similarly, the capital depreciation rate takes a lower value,  =0 04.






decreases as the economy becomes more reliant on con-
sumption in the new "rebalanced" scenario. This implies that in the new steady
state, the intermediate ﬁrms’ price markups over marginal costs are higher.16
As China moves up the value chain and away from labor-intensive manufactur-
ing, the produced goods become increasingly diﬀerentiated and ﬁrms’ markups
are likely to increase.17 Table 1 presents the parameters used in the simulations
in both scenarios.
16Given the other parameter values and the steady state investment share of GDP, the value




17Cui and Syed (2007) provide evidence that the sophistication of China’s export bundle
has increased, which reﬂects a technological upgrade of domestic production.
11       1
    
26 16 0985 084 0 134 006 060 29 076 090 50 45
       1
    
26 16 0985 084 0 134 004 040 29 076 090 50 2
Table 1: Parameters, baseline (top) and rebalanced economy (bottom)
3.2 Simulations
The impacts of technology shocks over 30 quarters on key variables in the model
are depicted in Figure 1. We present the results as annualized percentage de-
viations from steady state for two scenarios. The dynamics under the high
investment to GDP ratio (0.45) in the steady state are shown by the solid line.
The results for the low "rebalanced" ratio (0.2) in the steady state are illus-
trated by the dashed line. The higher value corresponds roughly to the ratio
of investment to GDP currently prevailing in China, while the lower ratio is
similar to the present one in high-income countries.18
The main results are similar in both scenarios. A positive technology shock
gives a boost to productivity, which causes a positive supply shock. Marginal
costs decrease, inﬂation recedes and investment increases.19 With a lower 
ratio, investment returns to steady state faster after a shock to technology.
Similarly, the impact of the technology shock on consumption is less persistent,
leading to less persistence in the response of overall output to technology shocks.
Monetary policy reacts to the fall in inﬂation via the Taylor rule, implying a
lower nominal interest rate in both scenarios. When the  ratio is lower,
a technology shock leads to a slightly more pronounced decline in inﬂation.
This implies that the reaction of the monetary authority is also stronger in this
case, as reﬂected in slightly larger declines in both the nominal and real interest
rates. Overall, however, the volatility of the real economy is reduced vis-á-vis
18An assumed decrease of 25 percentage points in the investment share of GDP might seem
radical, at least in the short run. However, some other Asian countries have also experienced
notable changes in their economic structures over time. In Singapore, the share of ﬁnal
consumption expenditure in GDP fell by 28 percentage points in 15 years (1962-1976), and in
Korea by 24 percentage points in 19 years (1960-1978).
19The surge in investment also relates to an increased demand for capital.
12technology shocks in the second scenario. After all variables have returned to
steady state, the long-run deviation from steady state (adding up the deviations
for each quarter) for consumption and output in the second scenario is 70% of the
deviation in the benchmark case. For investment, the rebalancing scenario gives
a total long-run deviation of 80% compared to the benchmark case. Our results
indicate that a rebalancing of the Chinese economy might lead to less persistent
and smaller long-run ﬂuctuations in consumption, investment and output. For
these key variables, the deviations from steady state last roughly 25 years in the
"rebalanced" economy, and 10 years longer in the baseline "present-day" case.20
Figure 1. Impact of technology shock
N e x t ,i nF i g u r e2 ,w ec o m p a r er e s p o n s e s to a contractionary monetary policy
shock in the two scenarios with diﬀerent  ratios. As inﬂation falls on impact,
the real interest rate increases even more than the nominal rate, and brings
20One reason for the persistence is the strong autocorrelation in the technology shock itself.
13about a monetary contraction. As investment and consumption fall, output
falls. This lowers the demand for inputs, and as marginal costs fall, the rate
of inﬂation declines via the Phillips curve. Here, the dynamics under the two
diﬀerent  ratios are very similar - more so than in the case of technology
shocks. It seems that when the  ratio is lower, the impact of a contractionary
monetary policy shock on inﬂation is smaller, but the diﬀerences are minor. A
similar impact on output obtains - a lower  ratio implies a smaller impact
on output for a monetary policy shock.
Figure 2. Impact of monetary policy shock
How sensitive are the dynamics of the "rebalancing" scenario to the speciﬁca-
tion of the monetary policy reaction function, in particular to the absence of
a policy response to the output gap? The transformation of the economy to-
ward a larger role for consumption could also involve an evolving role for the
monetary authority, including possible reaction to the output gap, in line with
14the estimated reaction functions for many advanced economies. We examine
cases where the output gap coeﬃcient in the Taylor rule is set at 0.5 or 1.0;
maintaining the inﬂation gap coeﬃcient at the former level then yields a policy
rule roughly in line with the observed behavior of the Federal Reserve (see Galí,
2008). As shown in Appendix A for the case where the output gap coeﬃcient
equals 0.5, the drop in inﬂation due to a technology shock is considerably larger
and the interest rate response by the monetary authority increases accordingly.
The increases in consumption and investment are smaller, relative to the steady
state, when the monetary authority responds to the output gap. Therefore,
the volatility of the real economy is smallest in the rebalancing scenario, with a
change in the monetary policy rule. However, the number of periods after which
consumption, investment and thus output return to steady state is similar in
both scenarios.
How robust are these ﬁndings to further changes in the model parameters,
i.e. allowing for the fact that as investment’s role in the economy recedes, further
changes in economic structures cannot be ruled out? Economic transformation
could entail changes in investment adjustment costs and behavioral changes
of households regarding the marginal disutility of working. We evaluate the
impacts of technology and monetary policy shocks in the economy assuming
both a decrease in investment adjustment costs (a fall in  from 3.4 to 1) and
an increase in these costs (a rise in  from 3.4 to 6).21 The response to monetary
policy shocks remains largely unchanged with the change in parameter values.
In the case of technology shocks, there is a smoother response of consumption
when  is assumed to equal 1. Not surprisingly, the reaction of capital to a
technology shock is also larger in this case. Regarding changes in the marginal
disutility of working, we evaluate the responses of the economy with  =3
(more elastic labor supply than in the benchmark case) and  =1 0 . Overall,
the results remain robust to changes in this parameter.22
21One could assume that in an advanced economy, investment adjustment costs are higher
as ﬁrms are operating with sophisticated technology and further adding to the capital stock
is increasingly costly.
22These results are available upon request.
154C o n c l u s i o n
Despite the stellar growth performance of the Chinese economy during the past
three decades, there is now a widespread consensus among both the Chinese
policymakers and international observers that the economy would beneﬁtf r o m
a broad-based rebalancing from investment and export-led growth to growth
increasingly based on domestic consumption. In this paper, we have analyzed
how a rebalancing away from investment-led growth would impact the dynamics
of the Chinese economy in the face of technology and monetary policy shocks.
To this aim, we presented a small-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model featuring price rigidities, habit persistence in consumption and
adjustment costs in investment, calibrated with data on the Chinese economy.
The results suggest that a rebalancing - also involving a higher labor share of
income - would imply a less persistent and smaller long-run response of the real
economy to technology shocks. When the investment share of GDP decreases,
the responses of both consumption and investment return faster to the steady
state. The lower volatility in the face of technology shocks is enhanced, if the
rebalancing also involves an increasing role for monetary policy in the stabiliza-
tion of output. The dynamics of the economy are, in contrast, very similar in
response to a monetary policy shock in both scenarios.
According to our model, in the new "rebalanced" steady state, the interme-
diate ﬁrms’ price markups over marginal costs are higher. Given that China is
moving up the value chain, its produced goods are likely to become increasingly
diﬀerentiated, which facilitates the increase in markups. Indeed, China’s 12th
Five-Year Plan (2011-15) aims at industrial upgrading, which should promote
investment in new equipment and technology, and involves a move away from
China’s traditional role as the world’s factory. If an increase in the quality of
investment is coupled with a lower investment-to-GDP ratio, the government’s
plan of industrial upgrading is consistent with an overall rebalancing of the
economy. Importantly, our results suggest that a structural rebalancing would
reduce volatility in China’s real economy, as the impacts of technology shocks
on consumption, investment, and thus on overall output become smaller in the
long run and less persistent. Therefore, our simulations can be seen to sup-
port the aim of the Chinese government and accord with recommendations of
16international observers, to transform the economy to one fuelled by the Chinese
consumer.
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